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I.

INTRODUCTION

The boilerplate debate is but a chapter in the story of liberalism, and
both must face the problem of freedom. Given the individualistic nature
of the Good, “[t]he problem in liberal society then becomes to insure that
each individual will achieve the greatest amount of liberty, the freedom
to pursue her own desires, and to establish an order that can restrain
conflicts among individuals and that does not favor some at the expense
of others.”1
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the problem of freedom cannot
be solved by liberal theory. Liberal theory sets individual rights against
social utility in an incoherent debate. Because liberalism has no
conception of human nature, there is no rational way to choose between
rights and utility. Thus, liberalism becomes a disguise for imposing
people’s arbitrary preferences by force.
And yet the boilerplate debate resists MacIntyre’s critique. In the
boilerplate debate, rights and utility are not set against each other.
*
Assistant Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A., University of NevadaReno; J.D., Duke University School of Law. The author thanks Charles Fried, H. Jefferson
Powell, C. Scott Pryor, Andrew Verstein, and Jack S. Wroldsen for their comments on drafts
of this Article.
1. Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA.
L. REV. 291, 329 (1985) (footnote omitted).
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Although there is profound disagreement between libertarians and
progressives over boilerplate, they agree about the terms of the debate:
the enforcement of boilerplate must vindicate both individual rights and
social utility.
This overarching agreement implies that—contrary to the tenets of
liberalism—the boilerplate debate is regulated by some concept of human
nature. Therefore, boilerplate theorists must direct their attention to
human nature if they are to resolve the problem of freedom in boilerplate
contracts.
This Article does not attempt to resolve the boilerplate debate,
although elsewhere I have tried to do so.2 This Article has different
purposes. First, this Article demonstrates that the boilerplate debate is
part of a much broader debate in liberalism. Second, this Article argues
that the boilerplate debate resists Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of
liberalism. Third, and most importantly, this Article seeks to reorient the
boilerplate debate toward a discussion of human nature.
Part I of this Article describes liberal political theory as a dialectic
narrative between libertarianism and progressivism, as well as Alasdair
MacIntyre’s profound critique of liberalism. Part II of this Article
describes the boilerplate debate as it has taken place over the last
hundred years. Part III of this Article situates the boilerplate debate
within liberalism. Part IV of this Article argues that the boilerplate
debate resists MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism, indicating that the
boilerplate debate is regulated by concepts of human nature and purpose.
II. THE LIBERALISM STORY
A. Tale of Two Liberties
Once upon a time, there was Authority, and people were ruled from
on high.3 They were ruled politically, spiritually, and intellectually.4 They
were ruled by kings, priests, and Aristotle.5 They had few rights, whether

2. See generally Kenneth K. Ching, What We Consent to When We Consent to Form
Contracts: Market Price, 84 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2015).
3. L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM 10 (1964); J.M. ROBERTS, THE NEW HISTORY OF THE
WORLD 572 (2003) (“Everywhere . . . the relative strength of rulers vis-à-vis their rivals
increased greatly from the sixteenth century onwards.”).
4. See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 160, 164, 207
(1992).
5. See id.; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 570.
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to property or contract, life or liberty.6 They were not the masters of their
fates or captains of their souls.7 They were not autonomous: they
obeyed.8 They obeyed the rules of their stations, to which they were
assigned at birth, and they obeyed the commands of their superiors.9
And the people suffered when authority was abused. Kings ruled
their subjects arbitrarily, and their subjects’ lives and property were
insecure.10 Peasants were compelled to provide labor for their lords, and
they had no right to move or seek new employment.11 People were taxed
heavily to finance standing armies and vain wars.12 Yet the nobles were
not taxed.13 They were given special privileges over the poor.14 The
church was not taxed.15 In fact, the church added to people’s burdens
through its collection of tithes.16 So for some, there were great privileges,
6. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 183–84 (1861); KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A
HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 1 (1990) (“During the
Middle Ages, property was not ‘owned’ in the modern sense and so could not be freely
contracted for. The economy of that time was not influenced to any significant degree by
market forces . . . . In circumstances where an economy is not directed by market forces and
where a society delineates a person’s rights based on the status one was born into, there is little
need of, nor opportunity for, either freedom of contract or a flexible contractual device for
planning.”).
7. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 562 (“Three hundred years ago, many men and women
believed [social forms and institutions] to be virtually God-given . . . .”).
8. Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 209 (“[Social-contract theory] was quite at odds with a
theocratic view of government, one which saw kings as divinely appointed, and their subjects
as divinely commanded to obey them . . . .”).
9. See MAINE, supra note 6, at 183.
10. Cf. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 16 (“Both logically and historically the first point of
attack is arbitrary government, and the first liberty to be secured is the right to be dealt with in
accordance with law. A man who has no legal rights against another, but stands entirely at his
disposal, to be treated according to his caprice, is a slave to that other. He is ‘rightless,’ devoid
of rights.”).
11. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 18 (Prometheus Books 2000)
(1991); KELLY, supra note 4, at 162; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 563, 567.
12. KELLY, supra note 4, at 246–47. French aristocrats
enjoyed and jealously preserved the most odious and abusive privileges, notably
freedom from taxation; this, together with the Church’s similar freedom in respect of
its own vast wealth, meant . . . an impossibly narrow tax base from which the royal
government was left to squeeze the revenue to support world-wide wars.
Id.; see also ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 573 (“[F]or three centuries great fertility of imagination
was to be shown in inventing new taxes . . . . Usually, this bore disproportionately on the
poorest . . . .”).
13. KELLY, supra note 4, at 246–47.
14. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 567.
15. KELLY, supra note 4, at 246–47; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 574.
16. Anti-clericalism grew based on the “opposition to tithes and to low standards among
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but not for common people.17 For commoners, there was no hope of
improving their condition.18 They could not own property.19 They had
little ability to arrange their private affairs through contracts.20 There was
no market, and so no opportunity to sell their goods and services to the
highest bidder.21
And who were they to complain? The king was appointed by God,
and the church said people had no right to resist their rulers.22 Aristotle
explained that it was good for them to be ruled by their betters because
they were by nature slaves.23 “[F]or most of human history most people’s
lives have been deeply and cruelly shaped by the fact that they have had
little or no choice about the way in which they could provide themselves
and their families with shelter and enough to eat.”24
Galileo debunked Aristotle.26
The
But things changed.25
Reformation shattered the rule and unity of the Church.27 People
the clergy . . . .” Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 162.
17. Id. at 246–47, 270; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 563, 574.
18. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 549.
19. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. KELLY, supra note 4, at 174; see also ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 564–65.
23. Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 195 (quoting Fernando Vazquez: “Who could endure the
impudence—not to say the unforgivable offensiveness—of Aristotle, when he says in the first
book of his Politics that men of slow intellect should be considered to have been born slaves by
nature, or for the service of people of greater wisdom? . . . And surely a much truer and more
worthy view is that of those upright and weighty jurists, who have written that slaves have been
made so only by the legal systems of men . . . while by the law of nature they have continued to
be free.”).
24. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 549.
25. Id. at 564–65 (“[A] broad tendency towards social change which strained old forms is
observable in many countries by 1700.”). These changes included literacy, social awareness,
the rise of a market economy, increased mobility, and increased populations in towns. See
KELLY, supra note 4, at 163 (movable type was invented, allowing lay persons to own Bibles);
HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 14 (“The modern State . . . starts from the basis of an authoritarian
order, and the protest against that order, a protest religious, political, economic, social, and
ethical, is the historic beginning of Liberalism.”).
26. ARTHUR HERMAN, THE CAVE AND THE LIGHT: PLATO VERSUS ARISTOTLE, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION 330–31 (2013); Granger Meador,
Unit 3: Falling Bodies, Reading: Galileo Drops Aristotle, INQUIRY PHYSICS (2008),
http://www.bps-ok.org/physics/inquiryfiles/03reading.pdf [https://perma.cc/XCN5-C7CN].
27. BRUCE L. SHELLEY, CHURCH HISTORY IN PLAIN ENGLISH 237 (3d ed. 2008); cf.
KELLY, supra note 4, at 159 (“[T]he revival of the Graeco-Roman tradition in art and literature,
and . . . the Protestant Reformation . . . brought into life the factors from which, in turn, the
modern world was born: the secularization of public life and the emancipation of the lay
individual from spiritual authority.”).
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revolted against their kings.28 Authority began giving way to autonomy.29
Traditional social hierarchies defined people less,30 and people thought
for themselves more.31 They believed they had the capacity and the right
to make judgments about all things, free from the authority of tradition.32
People did not need to conform to a pre-assigned human nature; they
could choose for themselves what they wanted be.33
Individuals were by nature free and equal.34 They were born with
rights such as life, liberty, and property.35 People only gave up these
“natural” rights to governments so that those rights could be protected
and made effective.36 Governments did not naturally have authority;
authority was delegated to government by the consent of the people.37
28. See HERMAN, supra note 26, at 401–04; ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 574; cf. KELLY,
supra note 4, at 162 (“[A] series of largely peasant revolts . . . . These were provoked by
taxation and noble oppression, and . . . the system . . . whereby the peasant was compelled to
perform labour services for his lord . . . .”); id. at 244 (“[A]ncient European structures of
authority and legitimacy were irreparably fractured by the French and American
Revolutions.”).
29. See KELLY, supra note 4, at 207 (“But free enquiry implied the repudiation not just
of ecclesiastical but of all authority, even that of Aristotle, the most venerable of the ancient
pagan philosophers.”).
30. ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 563–65.
31. There was a spirit of “independent judgment, of intellectual freedom and selfreliance, which was the very opposite of the old medieval mentality, accustomed to accept the
Church’s authority on everything.” Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 166. Erasmus looked to
Europe’s emancipation from “spiritual and ultimately from all intellectual authority.” Id.
32. See CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 97
(2007); cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 244 (“The [eighteenth] century also contained the high point
of the intellectual epoch which prepared the ground for revolution, the so-called
‘Enlightenment’, whose central feature was a rejection of all spiritual and intellectual
authority . . . .”).
33. Cf. JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DOCTRINE 119 (1991) (explaining that John Locke held that there was no ultimate end that
defined human beings).
34. The French Constitution of 3 September 1791 asserted that “men are born and remain
free and equal in rights . . . .” See KELLY, supra note 4, at 169, 291.
35. See id. at 216.
36. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 15–16.
37. Richard Hooker said:
Without which consent there were no reason that one man should take upon him to
be lord or judge over another; because, although there be, according to the opinion
of some very great and judicious men, a kind of natural right in the noble, wise, and
virtuous, to govern those which are of servile disposition; nevertheless, for
manifestation of this, their right, and men’s more peaceable contentment on both
sides, the assent of those who are governed seemeth necessary.
KELLY, supra note 4, at 171, 218.
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Therefore, political authority was essentially democratic.38 And people
wanted rule of law, not arbitrary government.39 Even kings should be
subject to the law.40 So the old regimes of privilege, injustice, intolerance,
and arbitrary government were put down, and the individual was lifted
up.41
The individual became primary, the lens through which government
was viewed. “Individuals come first. . . . [S]ocieties, nations, families,
team, traditions, religions, languages, and cultures—are the products of
individual persons.”42 The individual came before the government both
chronologically and morally.43 Given that individuals were the basic
social and moral unit, coercion of the individual against his will was a
great offence.44 An individual was not to be used as a means to someone
else’s ends.45
Thus, the individual and the rights he had delegated both defined and
limited the government.46 The government’s only purpose was to secure
the individual’s natural rights and then do no more.47 Any overstepping
38. Id. at 207.
39. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 17.
40. Cf. Kelly, supra note 4, at 234. King James was suspending the law, “levying money
and keeping a standing army in peacetime” without the consent of Parliament. Id. He was
imposing excessive bail and fines, all contrary to the law. Id. Equality meant that before the
law “every person may be bound alike, and that no tenure, estate, charter, degree, birth or
place do confer any exemption from the ordinary course of legal proceedings whereunto others
are subjected.” Id. at 236.
41. Id. at 270.
42. FRIED, supra note 32, at 19 (footnote omitted).
43. See DEWEY, supra note 11, at 16.
44. FRIED, supra note 32, at 22 (“When others try to force me to do what I judge I do not
want to do, or try to trick me into believing what I would not otherwise believe, they attack my
person at its deepest level.”).
45. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 131 (reprt. 1971) (1969) (“I wish my life
and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the
instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 22.
46. According to John Locke, government cannot be
absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joint
power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is
legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature before they
entered into society . . . . For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has
in himself . . . .
KELLY, supra note 4, at 217; see also HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 33.
47. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 16–17 (“It defined the individual in terms of liberties of
thought and action already possessed by him . . . and which it was the sole business of the state
to safeguard . . . . It followed that the great enemy of individual liberty was thought to be
government because of its tendency to encroach upon the innate liberties of individuals.”);
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of this bound was ultra vires, and an individual’s civil rights were to mirror
his natural rights as closely as possible.48 This meant that government
owed the individual a negative liberty: an individual should not be
prevented from attaining his goals, but no one, including the government,
owed him the positive duty of helping him attain his goals.49
These individualistic doctrines were not only moral; they were
practical.50 Progress and civilization were to spring from “the action of
individuals.”51 Individuals, not governments, knew what was best for
themselves.52 Adam Smith taught that the unfettered activity of
individuals was the “wellspring of social progress.”53 Each person would
work to improve his own condition, his own self-interest.54 And an
unregulated market would make men’s self-interest productive, not just
for themselves, but for society: “Allowing free trades on open
markets . . . increases efficiency and maximizes individual welfare by
channeling resources to their highest and best use.”55 Out of self-interest,
men would use their capacities to create the goods and services they could
sell at the highest price, and these products would be those things for
which society had the greatest need.56 This convergence of unplanned
individual efforts and desires would generate unprecedented material
abundance and benefit society as a whole.57 Government interference
HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 33.
48. See HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 33 (“Civil rights should agree as nearly as possible
with natural rights . . . .”).
49. BERLIN, supra note 45, at 122 (“You lack political liberty or freedom only if you are
prevented from attaining a goal by human beings.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 51 (“[Liberty] is
a relation among people. It is a relation in which each person refrains from interfering with the
self-determination of others. It is a relation in which people respect each other—in a limited
way, to be sure: they do not necessarily help each other get what they want or need . . . .”).
50. Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 305–06 (“[Economic regulation was] resisted not just by
inhumanity and greed, but from the conviction that the state had no business to interfere in the
relationships of master and workman or landlord and tenant, any more than in any other form
of private contract. This position was reinforced by the economic theory of the time . . . which
saw the unimpeded operation of free market forces . . . as likely in the long run to best promote
economic growth and thus the happiest overall result, whatever the temporary hardship to this
or that individual or group . . . .”).
51. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 34.
52. Cf. KELLY, supra note 4, at 317 (“[A] core belief of Benthamites was the sacredness
of individual freedom, including freedom to contract, on the grounds that the individual must
know best for himself what was most conducive to his own welfare . . . .”).
53. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 18; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 44.
54. See DEWEY, supra note 11, at 19.
55. FRIED, supra note 32, at 72–73; see also HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 44–45.
56. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 19; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 34.
57. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 19.
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with such economic liberty would not only trample on people’s rights but
hinder society’s progress.58 The best government could do was laissezfaire.59
But under laissez-faire, it became clear that people could not have
freedom if they did not also have equality.60 Using their economic
freedom, business interests concentrated their power until they occupied
greatly superior bargaining power over those with whom they
contracted.61 Individuals had little choice but to consent to whatever
corporations offered them in the “free market,” as there was no one else
to contract with.62 Such agreements were not based on true consent but
on implicit coercion.63 When legislatures tried to come to the aid of
workers, courts used “freedom of contract” as a tool to enforce the
unequal positions of the parties.64 Private control now operated as
oppressively as had public control.65 Corporations were like legislatures
now, and they could dictate harsh terms to their inferiors. It was like a
return to feudalism or arbitrary government.66 What good was freedom
58. Id. at 20.
59. Id. at 22.
60. Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 35 (“Thus from various sources and under various
influences there developed an inner split in liberalism.”); KELLY, supra note 4, at 306 (“Critics
of the ‘freedom of contract’ religion arose, who pointed out that there was no real freedom in
a relationship where the starting positions of the two sides were grossly unequal.”).
61. Cf. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 291 (“[In the nineteenth century], [t]he consolidation of
business power in a few hands was the most important factor in the destruction of both market
balance and equal economic opportunity. The imbalance in distribution of wealth was
aggravated by instrumental governmental policies protecting the strong through governmental
franchises, public utilities and trusts. . . . The concentration of power in a few brought on a drift
toward monopoly and a diminution of individual freedom to contract. Liberalism’s former
presumption that most contractors negotiated on an equal bargaining level was no longer
applicable.” (footnote omitted)).
62. Id. (“Consent was gone when a person’s whole livelihood was in the market but he
had no choice about the terms and often didn’t even have the right to contract with a person
with an individual identity.”).
63. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 50.
64. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 299.
65. Private control of the “forces of production . . . operate in the same way as private
unchecked control of political power.” DEWEY, supra note 11, at 44.
66. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 291 (“A former system of market exchanges based on
freedom of equal contracting parties was replaced by a neo-feudal corporate system of relations
based on superiors and inferiors.
Courts of the last quarter of the nineteenth
century . . . refused to interfere with one-sided exercise of power since all contracts made in
proper form were seen as enforceable. . . . Freedom of contract protected the unequal
distribution of property but didn’t protect weaker parties from coercion by these owners of the
means of production.” (footnote omitted)); cf. id. at 295 (“Some saw the weapon of ‘freedom
of contract’ facilitating the imposition of a new feudal order by industrial and commercial
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when there were no real choices?67 Freedom of contract had become a
means for undermining freedom. Laissez-faire had become the Ancien
Régime.68
Thus if individuals were to develop their capacities, government
needed to exert more control over individuals.69 The state could not
simply let freedom and nature take their “natural” course: many people
were unable to benefit from such unregulated freedom.70 Under laissezfaire, lack of government control had increased coercion of the weak by
the strong.71 People needed actual, not merely legal, liberty.72 Thus, the
state needed to adopt its own agenda to further human progress.73 This
progressivism was not intended to repudiate liberty, but to effectuate it.74
It was understood that liberty was relative to particular social
conditions.75 Medieval conditions may have required individualism, but
overlords through the private legislation of standardized contracts . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
67. See id. (“It became an illusion that the law protected the public interest against the
abuses of freedom of contract when freedom depended on one’s position on the economic
ladder.”).
68. Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 41 (“The economic and political changes for which they
strove were so largely accomplished that they had become in turn the vested interest . . . .”);
HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 47.
69. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 44 (“[S]ocial control of economic forces is equally necessary
if anything approaching economic equality and liberty is to be realized.”); HOBHOUSE, supra
note 3, at 54; KELLY, supra note 4, at 306 (“T.H. Green . . . restated the liberal faith in a form
which made it include respect for the dignity of the individual, recognition that he should have
the chance of fully unfolding his capacities, and an acknowledgment that the state had a role,
which might take the form of legislative interference and regulation, in affording him the basic
conditions in which this ideal might be achieved. The force of this reconstructed liberalism was
joined, in the 1880s, by beginnings of organized socialism . . . .”).
70. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 80 (“We all admit a collective responsibility for children.
Are there not grown-up people who stand just as much in need of care? What of the idiot, the
imbecile, the feeble-minded or the drunkard? What does rational self-determination mean for
these classes.”).
71. See TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 295.
72. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 37–40.
73. Id. at 34 (“[I]t is the business of the state to protect all forms and to promote all modes
of human association in which the moral claims of the members of society are embodied and
which serve as the means of voluntary self-realization. Its business is negatively to remove the
obstacles that stand in the way of individuals coming to consciousness of themselves for what
they are, and positively to promote the cause of public education.”).
74. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 47.
75. Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 54 (“[T]he conception of liberty is always relative to
forces that at a given time and place are increasingly felt to be oppressive. Liberty in the
concrete signifies release from the impact of particular oppressive forces . . . .”); TEEVEN, supra
note 6, at 296 (“Thus Adam Smith could be seen as correct in protesting against eighteenth
century paternalistic mercantile restrictions, but it was now argued that state intervention was
necessary to provide positive assistance for the furtherance of human progress.”).
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laissez-faire now required government intervention.76 By the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, government control over individual freedom had
spread to many areas of public life.77
We now turn from the narrative of liberalism to an analysis of that
narrative. Because of the tension between individual rights and social
welfare, liberalism presents us with “the problem of freedom.”78 Given
the individualistic nature of the Good, “[t]he problem in liberal society
then becomes to insure that each individual will achieve the greatest
amount of liberty, the freedom to pursue her own desires, and to establish
an order that can restrain conflicts among individuals and that does not
favor some at the expense of others.”79
We have seen that there are two streams of liberalism, one libertarian
and one progressive. Libertarians believe people have natural rights such
as life, liberty, property, and freedom of thought and contract.80 These
rights are not conferred by the state; people possessed them before there
were states.81 They are “prepolitical.”82 Such natural rights must be
secure against government interference.83
But progressives believe that rights are created and defined by
society; rights are to be limited or extended based on the benefit provided
to society as a whole.84 “[The community] may do with the individual
what it pleases provided that it has the good of the whole in view.”85 Even
the innermost aspects of a person, his thoughts, are considered “social.”86
Though progressives are solicitous of individual rights (they believe the
interest of individuals and their society ultimately coincide),87 they admit

76. See TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 296–97 (“The Progressives’ positive program was not
meant to overthrow private enterprise but instead was a middle ground between socialism and
individualism.”).
77. Id. at 296, 301; see also KELLY, supra note 4, at 352–53.
78. Cornell, supra note 1, at 328–29.
79. Id. at 329.
80. FRIED, supra note 32, at 80; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 32.
81. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 15 (“The outstanding points of Locke’s version of liberalism
are that governments are instituted to protect the rights that belong to individuals prior to
political organization of social relations.”).
82. FRIED, supra note 32, at 80; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 32.
83. FRIED, supra note 32, at 94; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 52.
84. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 36–38, 68.
85. Id. at 38.
86. Id. at 19.
87. See id. at 42.
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that in the final analysis there is no aspect of an individual’s life that is not
a social issue.88
This difference over the nature of rights leads to a difference over the
role of government. Libertarians believe in limited government.89 The
government’s role is to secure people’s natural rights, and to do more is
to transgress its limits.90 Because man’s essence is his autonomy,
“[p]aternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable.”91 Coercing men in
the name of some social goal is a road to hell paved with good intentions.92
But progressives believe government is not so limited and that it should
be used as an instrument of good to advance people’s welfare, especially
the economically disadvantaged.93
Libertarians believe that individuals are entitled to plan their lives
according to their own judgment, to choose their own vision of the
Good.94 “It is the capacity to choose and judge for ourselves that is the
essence of our individuality and so of our liberty.”95 Progressives deny, if
only implicitly, that individuals may choose their own Good, at least in an

88. Id. at 65 (“We should frankly recognize that there is no side of a man’s life which is
unimportant to society, for whatever he is, does, or thinks may affect his own well-being, which
is and ought to be matter of common concern, and may also directly or indirectly affect the
thought, action, and character of those with whom he comes in contact.”).
89. See LIBERTARIAN PARTY, LIBERTARIAN PARTY PLATFORM (2014),
https://www.lp.org/files/2014_LP_Platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UAX-49QW].
90. See DEWEY, supra note 11, at 15–16.
91. BERLIN, supra note 45, at 137.
92. Id. at 132–33 (“[W]e recognize that it is possible, and at times justifiable, to coerce
men in the name of some goal (let us say, justice or public health) which they would, if they
were more enlightened, themselves pursue . . . . I am then claiming that I know what they truly
need better than they know it themselves . . . . Once I take this view, I am in a position to ignore
the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf,
of their ‘real’ selves . . . .”); cf. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 26–28. Hobhouse, an early leader
of progressivism, opines that it is “doubtful” that the American “Negro . . . [is] mentally and
morally capable of self-government . . . .” HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 26–27. He also argues
against universal suffrage on the grounds that “people as a whole might be careless of their
rights and incapable of managing them. . . . It is perfectly possible that from the point of view
of general liberty and social progress a limited franchise might give better results than one that
is more extended.” Id. at 28.
93. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 30 (“Gradually a change came over the spirit and meaning
of liberalism. It came surely, if gradually, to be disassociated from the laissez faire creed and
to be associated with the use of governmental action for aid to those at economic disadvantage
and for alleviation of their conditions.”).
94. FRIED, supra note 32, at 94.
95. Id.
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absolute sense.96 Progressives believe that at times certain social goods
must trump the freedom of an individual.97
Despite these profound differences, there is a family resemblance
between libertarianism and progressivism. Both emphasize the right of
individuals to develop their own capacities.98 Both claim to promote the
welfare of both individuals and society.99 Both believe that people’s
freedom must be limited to some extent if their freedom is to be effective,
and yet both believe there are limits to those limits: there must be some
degree of individual freedom that government does not invade.100 Both
are protests against abuse of power.101
B. MacIntyre’s Critique of Liberalism
Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that the liberal dialectic between
libertarianism and progressivism is incoherent and can never be rationally
resolved.102 One side of the debate argues in terms of rights and limited
government.103 The other side argues in terms of utility, emphasizing that
individual rights are subordinate to social welfare.104 But this debate
suffers from “conceptual incommensurability.”105 There is no rational
way to decide which should have priority between rights and utility.106
Many efforts have been made to demonstrate a rational, secular basis for
96. Id. at 89; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 68.
97. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 38, 68.
98. Cf. DEWEY, supra note 11, at 33 (Progressives “remained faithful . . . to the ideals of
liberalism; the conceptions of a common good as the measure of political organization and
policy, of liberty as the most precious trait and very seal of individuality, of the claim of every
individual to the full development of his capacities.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 94 (“[O]nly in
a regime of secure entitlements can there be liberty. Only in such a regime are individuals able
to plan and develop their lives according to their plans, secure against the imposition of
others.”); HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 60.
99. FRIED, supra note 32, at 72–74; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 60.
100. BERLIN, supra note 45, at 124 (“[T]he area of men’s free action must be limited by
law. . . . [But] there ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on
no account be violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too
narrow for even that minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it
possible to pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or
sacred. It follows that a frontier must be drawn between the area of private life and that of
public authority.”); FRIED, supra note 32, at 89–90; HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 17.
101. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 75; KELLY, supra note 4, at 270–71.
102. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6–8 (2d ed. 1984).
103. See generally id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 8.
106. Id.
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one framework or the other, but MacIntyre argues that all such efforts
have failed.107 It is in reference to these issues of “conceptual
incommensurability” and irrationality that I will later show that the
boilerplate debate resists MacIntyre’s critique.
However, according to MacIntyre, given liberalism’s failure to give
rational grounds for its moral judgments, such judgments must be
expressions “of attitude or feeling” and “neither true nor false.”108 So all
that can be done is to presuppose the priority of one or the other; there is
no rational justification for any claims that an objective moral standard
exists.109 Given that there is no rational basis for choosing between rights
and utility as a basis for morality and ethics, such a decision can only be
made by an act of will.110 This means that the choice between moral
frameworks is arbitrary.111 Because morality is arbitrary, Nietzsche held
to a principled irrationalism for “if there is nothing to morality but
expression of will, my morality can only be what my will creates.”112
Ultimately, we can only try to force our wills upon each other.113
According to MacIntyre, we have arrived at this philosophy of
“Emotivism” by way of our escape from the authoritarianism of the
middle ages as “the individual” was freed from “constraining hierarchies”
and the “superstitions of teleology,” including the notion that human
beings have a human nature.114 So although the individual gained
“sovereignty in its own realm” by casting off Medievalism in favor of
Modernism, it left behind “its traditional boundaries provided by a social
identity and a view of human life as ordered to a given end.”115 Ethics
requires an account of human nature and human purpose.116 For
example, Aristotle said human beings were rational animals made for the
purpose of eudemonia, or happiness.117 But modern thought rejected
“any teleological view of human nature, any view of man as having an
essence which defines his true end.”118
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 54–61.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20–21.
See id. at 8.
Id. at 26, 113–14.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 14, 34.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 54.
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What is left after telos is rejected as an incoherent moral scheme in
which human nature is conceived of as needing moral education and
“moral injunctions” (i.e., promises should be kept) but without any
agreed upon purpose for why.119 In such a situation, any appeal to moral
rules must “appear as a mere instrument of individual desire and will.”120
Modern philosophy tries to substitute utility for teleology and underwrite
“rights” with reason.121 But utility proves an unworkable criteria for
ethics,122 and a secular account of human rights has failed.123 Utility and
rights are marshalled to make arguments seem objective, but in fact, they
are only vehicles for modern individuals’ will to power.124
II. THE BOILERPLATE DEBATE
For nearly one hundred years, one venue for the liberalism dialectic
has been the boilerplate debate. By “boilerplate,” this Article refers to
contracts of adhesion in which there is a significant disparity in bargaining
power between the parties, the offeror offers terms on a “take it or leave
it” basis, and the contract is formed after little or no negotiation. We will
see that the boilerplate debate parallels the liberalism dialectic, and then
we will consider what liberalism tells us about boilerplate and what
boilerplate tells us about liberalism.
In the late nineteenth century, the mass production and distribution
of goods and services led business firms to use form contracts to
standardize their relationships with their customers.125 Form contracts
decrease a firm’s transaction costs and increase its efficiency.126 The use
of form contracts eliminated the costly process of bargaining with
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 55, 65.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62–64.
When it is recommended that

we should guide our own choice by the prospects of our own future pleasure or
happiness, the appropriate retort is to enquire: ‘But which pleasure, which happiness
ought to guide me?’ . . . [A]ppeal to the criteria of pleasure will not tell me whether
to drink or swim and appeal to those of happiness cannot decide for me between the
life of a monk and that of a soldier.
Id. at 63–64.
123. Id. at 69; see also Nicholas Wolterstorff, Can Human Rights Survive Secularization?,
54 VILL. L. REV. 411 (2009).
124. MACINTYRE, supra note 102, at 71.
125. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 294.
126. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1221–22 (1983).
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individuals, replacing labor intensive and potentially idiosyncratic
negotiations with efficient take-it-or-leave-it forms, all while preserving
and enhancing a firm’s ability to negotiate later in the event of a
dispute.127 Forms also gave firms control over their agents by limiting
negotiation to a small number of terms and preventing the agent from
departing from the “script,” thus facilitating the management of the
firm.128 Forms facilitated the firm’s planning and security by making the
terms of a contract more certain, both because they were specified in
great detail and because they were drafted by the firm, and thereby firms
gained some control over potential disputes, made risks easier to predict,
and made business more efficient.129
It has been estimated that 99% of contracts are form contracts, and
form contracts are acknowledged as a modern necessity.130 However, for
at least one hundred years, commentators have expressed concerns over
adhesion contracts.131 The absence of consumer consent to adhesion
contracts is one primary problem as the consumer does not read or
understand boilerplate before signing it, and even if he did, he would have
minimal alternatives unless he were willing to forgo most goods and
services.132 “[T]his fact tends to suggest two polar positions: all terms are
valid, because signing is binding, or all form terms are potentially invalid,
because they are neither bargained for nor agreed upon.”133 The
widespread invalidation of form terms is assumed to be impracticable
given “[t]he economics of the mass distribution of goods” though it has
been argued that “nothing inherent in the concept of mass distribution
requires that the drafting party’s terms must prevail.”134 The question of
127. Cf. TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 294 (“Business favored standardized contracts because
of the cost of individualized handling of mass transactions and because of the control it gave
over its agents and the factors of production. Standardization facilitated better planning and
security by encouraging certainty and making risks more calculable under agreements drafted
with the needs of commercial interests in mind.”); Jason Scott Johnston, Cooperative
Negotiations in the Shadow of Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET
CONTRACTS 20–21 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007); Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1221, 1228.
128. Cf. Johnston, supra note 127, at 20–21; Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1222–24.
129. Cf. Johnston, supra note 127, at 19–21; Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1221–22.
130. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529–30 (1971).
131. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1178–79 (noting that many standard form contracts do not
raise the same issues as adhesion contract); see also Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of
Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 34–35 (1917).
132. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1179, 1228–29; see also Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and
the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1970).
133. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1207; see also Leff, supra note 132, at 349.
134. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1208.

646

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[99:631

which party, the drafter of the adhesive terms or the draftee, deserves
greater deference seems to depend on intuitions about whether the
government will distribute risks prudently.135
However, the most important criticism of adhesion contracts is that
they result in unfair bargains for consumers. Adhesion contracts tend to
maximize the rights of the firm and shift unfavorable terms onto
consumers.136 Nevertheless, courts have generally enforced form
contracts.137 There has been a wide range of calls for procedural and
substantive reforms of contracts of adhesion, as well as defenses of the
current regime.138
Karl Llewellyn states that in adhesion contracts the consumer’s assent
to the terms of the writing is relatively limited.139 A consumer specifically
assented to the few negotiated terms, and then gave blanket assent to the
remaining terms in the adhesion contract.140
However, because
consumers did not specifically assent to the unread terms, such “fine
print” should not be enforced if unreasonable.141 Llewellyn’s approach to
adhesion contracts bases the justification for enforcing contractual terms
on the parties’ consent.142 But this raises a question: what can one be
consenting to when one consents to unread terms? It cannot be said that
a person specifically agrees to those terms because the person does not
know what they are. Llewellyn’s solution is to describe a fictional
“blanket assent” to reasonable terms.143 It is fictional because, of course,
the parties to the contract have not discussed this blanket assent any more
than they have discussed the unread terms specifically.144
Llewellyn’s approach attempts to both vindicate and give content to
the parties’ decision to enter into a contractual relationship, including
those aspects of the deal that are “sound particularizations of the deal to
135. Cf. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1208 n.125. Rakoff notes that Arthur Leff seemed to
fear that the government would socialize too many risks; Rakoff believes that fear is
unsubstantiated. Id.
136. See id. at 1222, 1227.
137. Id. at 1184–85.
138. See infra pp. 646–55.
139. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
362–63 (1960).
140. See id. at 371.
141. See id. at 362–63.
142. See Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1199–1200.
143. See id. at 1200.
144. See id. (“Some adherents may have formed such an intent, but it is unlikely that the
majority of adherents do, or on reflection would, conceive of the relation in this manner.”).
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the business,” while fixing a boundary of fairness around that
relationship.145 Llewellyn expresses some concern that judges were not
well suited to draw the line between reasonable and unreasonable
terms.146 He believes that trade practices are good evidence of what
should be deemed reasonable in an adhesion contact (though he notes
that unreasonable trade practices need to be rejected) and suggests that
judges be deferential to an expert’s knowledge of what was fair in a given
trade.147
But Todd Rakoff responds that it is “not at all clear that the
businessman’s expertise, as applied, will yield a better result than the
judge’s impartiality.”148 An adhesion contract tends to reflect the art of
the lawyer, not the business person, and the lawyer will “draft up to the
limit allowed by law . . . .”149
There is no basis for presuming that the form incorporates any
relevant social wisdom. There may be a very good argument for
allowing parties to educate judges to practical realities, and a very
good argument against judges’ jumping to apply “general rules”;
but that is a far cry from adopting a presumption that the form
document should be enforced.150
Rakoff characterizes Llewellyn’s approach as an attempt to
understand adhesion contracts within a framework of private law, which
emphasizes the interaction of the contract parties.151 Another approach
is to “acknowledge frankly that the question whether to enforce form
terms presents a series of policy choices. If the question is to be
considered in this light, Llewellyn’s private law stance must be abandoned
in favor of an investigation of public law approaches.”152 Arthur Leff, for
example, suggests “a broad program of legislation coupled with
administrative enforcement, directed in part to requiring greater
disclosure of terms but aimed primarily at the outright prohibition of
particular clauses and devices in adhesion contracts.”153 For Leff,
145. See id. at 1202–03. Llewellyn believed in enforcing terms unless they were “too
unfair.” Id.
146. Id. at 1202–04.
147. Id. at 1204.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1205.
150. Id. at 1206.
151. Id. at 1198.
152. Id. at 1206–07.
153. Id. at 1207 (citing Leff, supra note 132, at 357).
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adhesion contracts are used by firms to maximize profits by avoiding
risks, and the administration of these risks is a matter of public policy
because adhesion contracts “are mass produced and treat a large number
of persons in the same way.”154 Thus, form contracts should be regulated
like products liability.155
This argument would justify public control of form contracts, but it
also seems to prove too much by implying that the government should
determine all the terms of form contracts.156 If the government should
regulate non-negotiated terms, why shouldn’t it regulate the negotiated
terms as well? “[O]nce full enforceability is denied, the premises
supporting any degree of enforcement are called into question. . . .
[F]rom the public law standpoint, one perceives no reason not to employ
rules created by the legal system instead of by the draftsman.”157
Fredrich Kessler writes that adhesion contracts are the result of the
“trend of competitive capitalism towards monopoly.”158 Kessler identifies
the dynamic of bargaining power as allowing firms to dictate terms to
consumers.159 The consumer comes to the firm in need of goods and
services, but the consumer is denied the opportunity to negotiate terms
because the firm has a monopoly or because all of the firm’s competitors
use similar terms.160 Thus, the consumer must accept what the firm
offers.161 The enforcement of form contracts grants authoritarian power
to business firms.162
Rakoff argues that the usual assumption that form contracts generate
economic utility cannot be accepted at face value.163 In fact, the opposite
should be assumed. Because consumers do not read form contracts,
profit-seeking firms are incentivized to shift costs to consumers without

154. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1209; see also Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19
AM. U. L. REV. 131, 140–42 (1970).
155. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1209.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1215.
158. Fredrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
159. Id. at 632.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 640.
163. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1231.
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lowering their prices.164 Thus, so-called “freedom of contract” in
adhesion contracts works to exploit consumers.165
Although in the past, freedom of contract served to promote the
growth of the market economy and empower people previously unable to
freely organize their private lives, it has become the contemporary
embodiment of laissez-faire, which causes courts to overlook “the
elements of liberty that are actually at stake.”166 Freedom of contract in
the adhesion contract context does not protect the liberty of a real person,
but a “drafting organization.”167 But enforcing form contracts does not
enhance the development of a human being’s capacities through the
exercise of individual choice; the form contract is simply the business
technology of a non-human organization.168 What is really at stake is the
domination of individual human beings by business firms via contract
law.169 “[R]ecognizing that elimination of such domination, where it
exists, is . . . a fulfillment of liberty . . . .”170
Therefore, public officials should choose the terms to be enforced in
an adhesive contract and choose those terms to promote the common
good.171 Rakoff finds that adhesive contracts should not be presumed to
be enforceable.172 Terms that are consciously bargained-for or shoppedfor will be analyzed and enforced according to normal contract law.173 But

164. Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68
LA. L. REV. 118, 172 (2007); Jonathan Klick, The Microfoundations of Standard Form
Contracts: Price Discrimination vs. Behavioral Bias, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 556 (2005)
(“This efficiency view implies that in competitive markets, standardized terms will benefit
buyers. A corollary to this is that if we observe ‘abusive’ standardized terms, the market is
presumptively monopolistic. Casual observation suggests that standardized contracts are
nearly ubiquitous, and a great many of the standardized terms appear to benefit the seller to
the potential detriment of the buyer.” (footnote omitted)); Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1235
(2003) (“When buyers cannot verify quality, the market will produce lower-quality goods.
Ironically, far from guaranteeing a market equilibrium of efficient terms, competition can
guarantee an equilibrium of inefficient terms.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Rakoff, supra note 126,
at 1204 (“[T]he businessman who absorbs risks may find it difficult to compete with others who
can lower prices because they disown risks.”).
165. See Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1235.
166. See id. at 1235–36.
167. Id. at 1236.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1236–37.
170. Id. at 1237.
171. Id. at 1238.
172. Id. at 1243.
173. Id. at 1251.
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because of the inevitable infringement on individual’s freedom, adhesive
terms should be presumptively unenforceable.174
Randy Barnett questions Rakoff’s proposal on many grounds. He
doubts public officials are capable of writing appropriate terms to replace
adhesive terms.175 Such a process will increase transaction costs and
ultimately harm consumers.176 This process will also increase uncertainty
of transactions because both drafters and adherents will require legal
counsel to learn what terms a court is likely to impose upon their
contractual relationship.177
Barnett acknowledges that parties do not read form contracts or give
specific agreement to terms.178 But this is part of “rational ignorance.”179
Rational ignorance means that given the low probability that a dispute
will arise over one of the unread terms, and given the low stakes involved
in most form contracts, it would be “irrational for form-receiving parties
to spend time reading, much less understanding, the terms in the forms
they sign.”180 This puts the drafter in the position of knowing that an
adherent will consent to the form without reading it or understanding it.181
This is a problem for the traditional approach to contractual assent, as it
suggests that the parties to a form contract have not actually reached any
agreement, and therefore, the form is not binding.182 Yet, despite these
problems, form contracts offer economic benefits to both drafters and
adherents.183 Thus, Barnett offers a justification for the enforcement of
174. Id. at 1238.
175. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contract, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 627, 633–34
(2002).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 634.
178. Id. at 629.
179. Id. at 631; Daniel E. Wenner, Note, Renting in Collegetown, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
543, 572–73 (1999) (“The utilization of form contracts creates an environment in which ‘rational
ignorance plays a particularly powerful role.’ The resource costs of making an informed
decision with respect to a form contract are extremely high. Form contracts often contain many
legal terms, the language of which confuses laypeople. To execute a form contract safely, a
layperson would have to pay an attorney to review it, further increasing the transaction costs
and limiting the form contract’s efficiency. Indeed, even an attorney would not parse every
inch of a form contract when he endeavors to ‘rent a car, purchase an airline ticket, enter a
parking garage, or sign a car loan agreement or apartment lease.’” (footnotes omitted)).
180. Barnett, supra note 175, at 631; cf. Klick, supra note 164, at 562 (“That is, perhaps
the reason that certain terms are systematically non-salient is because their ultimate importance
is trivial.”).
181. Barnett, supra note 175, at 629–30.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 630–31 (citing Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1220); Michelle A. Sargent, Note,
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form contracts. According to Barnett, consenting to form contracts is not
about making a promise that a party would need to have actually
understood. Instead it is “about manifesting consent to be legally
bound.”184
Now think of click license agreements on web sites. When one
clicks “I agree” to the terms on the box, does one usually know
what one is doing? Absolutely. There is no doubt whatsoever that
one is objectively manifesting one’s assent to the terms in the box,
whether or not one has read them. The same observation applies
to signatures on form contracts. Clicking the button that says “I
agree,” no less than signing one’s name on the dotted line,
indicates unambiguously: I agree to be legally bound by the terms
in this agreement.185
Barnett’s main point is that “in principle, one can consent to terms
one does not read. . . . [O]ne can consent to terms one is not even shown
in advance.”186 The only limit is that the drafter may not “exceed some
bound of reasonableness.”187
Barnett’s approach has the advantage of being in accord with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s.188 In Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, Eulala Shute
attempted to sue Carnival Cruise Lines in her home state of Washington
after being injured during a cruise.189 However, the tickets that Eulala
had purchased indicated that she could only sue in Florida, and ultimately
the U.S. Supreme Court enforced the forum selection clause. The fact
that the forum selection clause was adhesive and would make it difficult
for the Shutes to bring suit did not make the term unenforceable.190 The
Court did say that such terms were to be scrutinized for “fundamental
fairness.”191 However, the term in question was found to be reasonable
because it served a rational business purpose, enhanced clarity about the
Misplaced Misrepresentations: Why Misrepresentation-of-Age Statutes Must Be Reinterpreted as
They Apply to Children’s Online Contracts, 112 MICH. L. REV. 301, 307 (2013) (“[C]ourts’
opinions have emphasized the economic benefits of form contracts and boilerplate
language . . . .”).
184. Barnett, supra note 175, at 634.
185. Id. at 635.
186. Id. at 641 (emphasis omitted).
187. Id. at 638.
188. Barnett offers Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991), as an
example of his consensual approach to form contracts. See Barnett, supra note 175, at 638–39.
189. 499 U.S. at 585.
190. Barnett, supra note 175, at 639.
191. Id.
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parties’ rights, conserved judicial resources, and was economically
beneficial for all involved.192
All of these pragmatic justifications have been questioned. Of course
a term in a form contract serves a business purpose, but shouldn’t this
purpose be weighed against the detriment it imposes on the consumer?193
Also, it is doubtful that form terms actually make parties’ rights and
obligations clear, at least for consumers, because people do not read form
contracts.194 Apparently, judicial resources are not actually conserved by
form contracts, as forum selection clauses are frequently litigated.195 And
perhaps most importantly, form contracts may not in fact reduce prices
for consumers. Competition cannot cause firms to improve contract
quality when consumers are not reading form contracts because there will
be no comparison-shopping for terms of which they are unaware.196 In
other words, competition will actually cause firms to draft worse terms in
their form contracts.
However, even if the pragmatic justifications for adhesion contracts
are in question, there remains the autonomy argument. Barnett writes
that “[r]efusing to enforce all of these terms would violate their freedom
192. See Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise
Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 340–41 (1992).
193. Id. at 342.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 342–43.
196. Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law,
66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2014); cf. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R.
Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts,
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2014) (“We find that the fraction of consumers who read such contracts
is so small that it is unlikely that an informed minority alone is shaping software license
terms.”); Becher, supra note 164, at 172 (“This reality, in turn, creates a market failure that
results from sellers’ race-to-the-bottom since it provides contract drafters with a profit incentive
to include low quality (non-salient) terms in their pre-drafted forms.”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243–44 (1995); Lee
Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in
Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 716–21 (1992) (rejecting economists’
assertions that contracts of adhesion are efficient); Klick, supra note 164, at 556 (“This
efficiency view implies that in competitive markets, standardized terms will benefit buyers. A
corollary to this is that if we observe ‘abusive’ standardized terms, the market is presumptively
monopolistic. Casual observation suggests that standardized contracts are nearly ubiquitous,
and a great many of the standardized terms appear to benefit the seller to the potential
detriment of the buyer.”); Korobkin, supra note 164, at 1235 (“When buyers cannot verify
quality, the market will produce lower-quality goods. Ironically, far from guaranteeing a
market equilibrium of efficient terms, competition can guarantee an equilibrium of inefficient
terms.” (footnote omitted)); Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1204 (“[T]he businessman who absorbs
risks may find it difficult to compete with others who can lower prices because they disown
risks.”).

2016]

LIBERALISM'S FINE PRINT

653

to contract.”197 Although consumers sign form contracts without reading
them, “[t]hey would rather run the risk of agreeing to unread terms than
either (a) decline to agree or (b) read the terms.”198
Behavioral economics calls into question this autonomy-based
argument. People cannot rationally assess or reject terms that they do
not know exist.199 Moreover, this ignorance-based consent is unlikely to
be economically efficient. “[P]eople deviate, in systematic ways, from
what is supposed (by standards of efficiency) to be rational behavior.”200
Consumers are overly optimistic, poor at estimating risk, prone to
ignoring unfavorable terms in form contracts, throwing good money after
bad, and accepting unfavorable price changes during contract
formation.201
These arguments cast doubt on the premise of autonomous choice.
People do not always make good choices, so perhaps we should not look
favorably on their choice to “consent” to boilerplate. But some go further
and simply deny that consent to form contracts is an act of autonomy.
“[T]he enforcement of form terms is objectionable because it undermines
individual autonomy, as the buyer finds herself obligated to terms to
which she did not voluntarily agree.”202
Margaret Radin argues that adhesion contracts are in fact an assault
on our politics of individual rights and that enforcement of certain
adhesive terms results in “democratic degradation.”203 “[O]ur system is
197. Barnett, supra note 175, at 639 (emphasis omitted).
198. Id. at 639.
199. Cf. Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using “Knowing
Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-For Terms in Standard Form Contracts, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 523 (2008) (“The Court ignored the unlikelihood that average cruisegoers would read material received after they paid for their tickets and once they confirmed
that their tickets were enclosed in the envelope.”).
200. Becher, supra note 164, at 123; cf. Eisenberg, supra note 196, at 213 (“Rationality
requires, among other things, that when consequences are uncertain, their likelihood is
evaluated without violating the basic rules of probability theory. . . . [E]mpirical evidence
shows that actors characteristically violate the standard rational-choice or expected-utility
model, due to the limits of cognition.”).
201. Ching, supra note 2, at 13; Avery Weiner Katz, Standard Form Contracts, in THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 502, 504 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998) (noting that asymmetric information can result in inefficient terms in form contracts);
Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the
Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 585 (1990) (“[I]mperfect consumer information causes a
tendency toward inefficiency in transactions involving consumer form contracts.”).
202. Korobkin, supra note 164, at 1205; Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1238.
203. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAW 33 (2013).

654

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[99:631

committed to the moral premise . . . that people who enter contracts are
voluntarily giving up something in exchange for something they value
more.”204 But consumers are not voluntarily giving up these rights, and
through adhesive contracts, firms become lawmaking bodies which are
deleting people’s basic political rights, such as jury trials and rights of
redress.205 Adhesive contracts thereby jeopardize the distinction between
the public–private sphere, the idea of private ordering, and rule of law.206
Radin’s proposed solution is to make a number of legal rights inalienable
via adhesion contracts.207
Omri Ben-Shahar has resisted Radin’s proposal.208 He insists that
when firms use adhesion contracts, even—or especially—those that
delete important consumer rights, consumers benefit by paying lower
prices for goods and services.209 If firms were prevented from deleting
consumers’ rights through adhesion contracts, prices would go up, which
would disproportionately affect the poor.210
Ben-Shahar argues that it is likely that a majority of consumers are
delighted to get a product at a lower price, even if it is at the cost of certain
legal rights.211 Although there may be a minority who do not share this
preference, it would be anti-democratic to impose this minority’s
preferences on the majority by prohibiting firms from offering rightsdeleting form contracts.212 If consumers wanted to preserve their legal
rights, the market would supply such an option.213 To Ben-Shahar, a
program of inalienable legal rights looks like a threat to individual
autonomy, not protection of it.214 People should be allowed not to care
about their legal rights, he argues.215 In short, regulating boilerplate
204. Id. at 15.
205. Id. at 16–17, 33.
206. Id. at 33, 35, 38.
207. Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV.
883, 892 (2014) (“In Radin’s autonomist regime, the right to a jury trial, to participate in a class
action, to a substantial warranty, to expectation damages, to fair-use rights in digital content,
and to various other ends, should be elevated to a quasi-mandatory status. No more boilerplate
opting out.”).
208. Id. at 892, 895.
209. Id. at 895.
210. Id. at 900–01.
211. Id. at 896–98.
212. Id. at 896.
213. Id. at 898.
214. Id. at 899.
215. Cf. id. at 899 (“Because the issues governed by boilerplate are complex and largely
unfamiliar, being occupied by them can detract from one’s sense of control. And having to pay
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would both violate individuals’ autonomy and cause them to pay higher
prices.
III. THE BOILERPLATE CHAPTER OF THE LIBERALISM STORY
The boilerplate debate seems to be an inevitable outcome of
liberalism.216 Libertarian impulses drive one side of the debate.
Boilerplate arises from liberalism’s granting to individuals both private
property and the freedom to exercise their subjective judgment about
what to do with it, so as to develop their individual capacities and life
plans.217 Boilerplate expands the private sphere, allowing people to
engage in private ordering with only minimal oversight by public
officials.218 As Rakoff notes, when we consider boilerplate, we tend to
assume that government is limited and that it must justify itself before it
interferes with people’s freedom of contract.219 Boilerplate could be
thought of as an instrument of natural right, as people, by the authority
of their own autonomous wills, bind themselves to their promises.
Boilerplate enacts a formal equality between contracting parties,
largely disregarding the parties’ circumstances, including wealth,
necessity, and sophistication.220 By enforcing boilerplate contracts, courts
grant people negative liberty, in which absent something like fraud or
unconscionability, the contract will be enforced.221 And boilerplate is
recognized as a virtual necessity in the individualistic market economy
and is deemed to benefit both consumers and business firms.222
Yet boilerplate raises all the same concerns progressivism has about
individualism. Though there may be legal equality between a business
firm and a consumer, there is enormous substantive inequality between
them. Formally, a boilerplate contract may look like an agreement
between autonomous parties, but substantively it is more like private
legislation imposed on consumers by business firms.223 And the likely
consequence is substantively unfair contracts.
higher prices unless people are smart and sophisticated enough to thoughtfully waive these
rights would make most people feel less autonomous. For many, the choice not to bother is the
ultimate liberator.” (emphasis omitted)).
216. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1217–18.
217. RADIN, supra note 203, at 35.
218. Id. at 34–35.
219. Rakoff, supra note 126, at 1236.
220. See id. at 1188.
221. See id. at 1190–93, 1236–38.
222. Id. at 1230.
223. Ben-Shahar, supra note 207, at 884.
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Even if substantively unfair contracts were acceptable, progressives
doubt that when consumers accept boilerplate terms, they are acting
autonomously. There is no real choice because the market only offers
boilerplate terms. Further, behavioral economics undermines the notion
that consumers acceptance of boilerplate terms is rational or
economically efficient.224 In order to effectuate freedom of contract and
economic efficiency, progressives argue that government must intervene
in boilerplate contracts, not in derogation of individual liberty, but for its
effectuation.225
Because the boilerplate debate evokes the themes of liberalism,
perhaps it is susceptible to Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism. As
in the liberal dialectic, the boilerplate debate is conducted in terms of
rights and utility.226 Critics of boilerplate argue that accepting boilerplate
is not a real act of autonomy, while apologists argue adherents receive
lower prices because of boilerplate.227 Critics argue that boilerplate is not
actually efficient, while apologists argue that it would violate a person’s
freedom of contract not to enforce boilerplate terms.228 But rights and
utility are incommensurable, according to MacIntyre, and this setting of
rights against utility is, thus, irrational.229
And the reason we cannot rationally choose between rights and utility
in the boilerplate debate is because liberalism lacks concepts of human
nature and purpose. Liberalism specifically leaves those issues to
individuals’ subjective judgment.230 So, Radin sees people degrading
themselves by giving up their legal rights via boilerplate, but Ben-Shahar
sees the same people as satisfied customers.231 Neither can be objectively
“correct” if telos is in the eye of the beholder. What would it even mean
to degrade a person who does not have a particular human nature? And
how can you decide whether “satisfied customer” is a desirable outcome
without a particular conception of human purpose?
This is not to say that people cannot choose between the frameworks
of rights and utility. It is simply to say that absent concepts of human
nature and purpose, such choices must be arbitrary acts of will. And if
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Becher, supra note 164, at 120, 178–79.
See TEEVEN, supra note 6, at 296–97.
See MACINTYRE, supra note 102, at 70–72.
Ben-Shahar, supra note 207, at 886.
Id. at 885.
MACINTYRE, supra note 102, at 71.
See id. at 70–72.
See RADIN, supra note 203, at 15, 33; Ben-Shahar, supra note 207, at 897.
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our selection of moral frameworks is arbitrary, the imposition of that
framework must be by force, not reason. In such a situation the logical
outcome is for those in power to impose their preferences on their
subjects.232 Perhaps such will to power is evidenced by business firms like
Carnival Cruise Lines using boilerplate to impose forum selection clauses
on unwitting consumers like the Shutes.233
So does the boilerplate debate confirm MacIntyre’s thesis about the
incoherence of liberalism? The final part of this Article argues that the
boilerplate debate, in fact, resists MacIntyre’s critique and demonstrates
the rationality of liberalism, at least in the context of the boilerplate
debate.
IV. CONCLUSION: BOILERPLATE, THE RATIONALITY OF LIBERALISM,
AND HUMAN NATURE
In this part, I will offer three pieces of evidence that the boilerplate
debate resists MacIntyre’s critique of liberalism: (1) courts are not
engaged in paternalistic overreach; (2) business firms are not imposing
harsh terms on consumers; and (3) in the boilerplate debate, rights and
utility are not set against each other, as advocates argue that both rights
and utility justify their positions.
The liberal narrative suggests that what should concern us about
boilerplate is the potential for abuse of power. Freedom is not an
abstraction to be analytically unpacked so we can learn what it means.
Nothing in the definition of “freedom” will tell us whether we should
enforce or invalidate a boilerplate contract. Instead, it is the relevant
circumstances that tell us what freedom means. And whether it was the
Ancien Régime or laissez-faire, liberalism’s use of the concept of freedom
has been oriented by abuse of power. Likewise, if MacIntyre’s diagnosis
of liberalism were correct, we should expect to find abuse of power via
boilerplate.
When it comes to boilerplate, where should we look for abuse of
power? Libertarianism looks first to the government as a likely culprit,
and we should not ignore the possibility of paternalistic infringement
upon individual freedom.234 Yet, when it comes to boilerplate contracts,
232. C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 75 (Simon & Schuster 1996) (1944).
233. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991).
234. Cf. HOBHOUSE, supra note 3, at 26–28. Hobhouse, an early leader of progressivism,
opines that it is “doubtful” that the American “Negro . . . [is] mentally and morally capable of
self-government . . . .” Id. at 26–27. He also argues against universal suffrage on the grounds
that “people as a whole might be careless of their rights and incapable of managing them. . . . It
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the law favors the enforcement of boilerplate, and courts tend to refrain
from interfering with boilerplate relationships.235 Currently, there is little
danger that courts will abuse their power in the boilerplate context, at
least through paternalistic overreaching.
The more likely source of abuse of power is business firms. Many
scholars have noted the likelihood that business firms will use boilerplate
to impose one-sided terms on consumers.236 The logic of the market
seems to require it. And yet, surprisingly, the empirical evidence
confounds this expectation.
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler has been engaged in empirical research
that essentially studies whether standard form contracts are “an
instrument of market power” allowing “dominant corporations” to
impose one-sided terms on consumers or if instead competition forces
such contracts to be efficient.237 Marotta-Wurgler analyzed 647 software
license agreements from 598 different software companies.238 She
constructed an index to measure these agreements’ “buyer
friendliness.”239 The index was based on twenty-five common terms that
allocate rights and risks between contract parties, and she then measured
the buyer or seller friendliness of each term relative to the default rules
of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.240 Marotta-Wurgler also
investigated the role competition plays in determining these agreements’
terms.241
Marotta-Wurgler’s research revealed that these agreements did tend
to be seller friendly. However, she also determined that sellers offer the
same terms to consumers and large businesses via boilerplate, indicating
that sellers are not taking advantage of their bargaining power over
is perfectly possible that from the point of view of general liberty and social progress a limited
franchise might give better results than one that is more extended.” Id. at 28.
235. Cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado
About Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, supra note
127, at 45, 51 (noting that forum selection and arbitration clauses in form contracts have
generally been enforced). See generally Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. 585.
236. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 203; Ben-Shahar, supra note 207; Rakoff, supra note
126.
237. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form
Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements 2 (Law and Economics
Research
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
05-11,
2005),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=799274 [https://perma.cc/Q7DV-6CY2].
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id. at 4.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 25–33.
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consumers in order to impose one-sided terms.242 Further, she has found
that contract terms do not become more biased depending on whether
Counterintuitively, one
sellers have greater market power.243
measurement of sellers’ market power actually indicated that increased
market power was associated with “slightly more pro-buyer terms.”244
“[W]e can conclude that market power, however defined, does not lead
to meaningfully worse standard terms overall . . . .”245
Marotta-Wurgler’s research suggests that business firms are not using
their superior bargaining power to impose one-sided terms on less
powerful consumers. If they were, we should see worse terms being
offered to the general public than to the large businesses, but that is not
the case, at least according to Marotta-Wurlger’s research.246
Thus, boilerplate tells us something surprising: both the public and
private sectors are more or less behaving themselves. Courts are not
engaged in paternalistic overreach, and business firms are not imposing
harsh terms on consumers. Contrary to MacIntyre’s argument, the
powerful are not arbitrarily imposing their will on the people. Why?
According to MacIntyre, will to power is preceded by incoherence in
liberal moral dialogue, when rights are set against utility.247 But when we
turn to the boilerplate debate, we find something interesting about the
roles played by rights and utility. They are not set against each other.
They are not adversaries, but allies. Both sides of the boilerplate debate
argue that their programs vindicate both rights and utility.248 Boilerplate
apologists argue that consumers consent to boilerplate and that the
enforcement of boilerplate benefits consumers and business firms.249
Boilerplate critics argue that consumers have not really consented and
that enforcement of boilerplate is inefficient.250 Neither side asserts that
rights trump utility or vice versa. The framework is agreed upon:
boilerplate enforcement requires both individual consent and social
utility.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 4, 25, 34.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 4.
See MACINTYRE, supra note 102, at 70–71.
See Ben-Shahar, supra note 207.
Id. at 885.
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Of course, there is disagreement about what counts as consent and
what counts as utility, but there is agreement about the terms of the
debate. Disagreement is not always because of incommensurability. In
fact, MacIntyre notes that “when a tradition is in good order it is always
partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of which
gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose.”251 At least in the
boilerplate debate, liberalism, whether libertarian or progressive, insists
on promoting both individual rights and social welfare. There is often
disagreement about how to promote these goods, or even what these
goods actually consist of, but there is agreement about the framework of
the debate. Thus, the disagreement is rational.
And if the boilerplate debate is rational, something greater is implied.
Moral debate becomes irrational, according to MacIntyre, when it is
conducted without reference to human nature and purpose.252 Thus, if
the boilerplate debate is rational, we can infer that, somehow, it is being
regulated by concepts of human nature and purpose, those concepts
ostensibly disclaimed by liberalism long ago.
What is human nature? What is human purpose? These are the
questions theorists must address if they are to answer the practical
questions posed by both liberalism and boilerplate. The overarching
rationality of the boilerplate debate resists MacIntyre’s charge that
liberalism is incoherent. But this rational framework does not answer the
specific questions of the boilerplate debate. What is better for a person,
to retain their legal rights or to get a good price on an iPhone? To answer
such questions, theorists must turn their attention to human nature and
purpose.

251. MACINTYRE, supra note 102, at 222.
252. Id. at 70–71.

